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SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCESFOR CANADA BY KENT ROACH
(MONTREAL AND KINGSTON: McGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 2003) 272 PAGES.
BY MARGARET E. BEARE1
This book does more than provide the reader with an extremely
thorough analysis of the debates that surrounded the introduction of a
broad range of anti-terrorism measures in Canada including the AntiTerroismAct.2 Kent Roach is in the unique position of being a legal scholar
who is equipped to apply a social science analysis to these issues. Social
positions, societal definitions, and politics are all very relevant to not only
the making of laws but also the interpretation of them. Law is seen to be
relevant only in context-more often serving a symbolic function rather
than a strictly utilitarian one. The advantage of topics like terrorism,
organized crime, or any other ill-defined concept is that they can
metamorphose into a very different type, and degree, of threat under the
pens (or the computer equivalent) of writers, representing either different
disciplines or different vested interests-or both.
All national security matters have traditionally been cloaked in
secrecy. How does one know if Canadian responses will work effectively to
curb the threats from organized crime, corruption, or terrorism if one does
not know accurately what those threats are? One is not particularly
reassured by the comments of former Minister of Justice Anne McLellan
in response to the various criticisms of the reach of the proposed antiterrorism bill: "Gosh, you know, I wish you were in my shoes for 24 hours.
Associate Professor, Department of Law and Sociology, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
2 Bill C-36,Anti-TerrorismAct, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001(as passed by the House of Commons 28
November 2001).
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I wish you knew what I know .... " Anyone who has worked with the police
in any capacity knows how useful this claim to special, secret knowledge can
be, when wider circulation of the information might do no harm and
prompt very different responses from people in similar situations. The "war
on terrorism" has been called a propaganda war and one does not want to
mess with the desired tone of the message. As President Bush has said,
"Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists."4 Hence, "knowing"
what the real threats are becomes even more impossible than it previously
was and the link that is currently being made between organized crime,
transnational crime, money laundering, and terrorism has ratcheted the
rhetoric machinery way up!
The essential question posed in part by Roach is the following: Did
very much change after 11 September 2001 ("9/11")? His answer helps to
determine his analysis, and he outlines his two main goals: first, to examine
developments in Canadian law within the two years between the attacks and
the publication of his book; second, to examine notions of democracy and
policies related to immigration, the military, foreign affairs, and security
capabilities. In addition, Roach attempts to outline how this response ought
to evolve in the future to deal realistically with both terrorism and potential
terrorism.5
In response to the question as to whether the terrorism threat was
new, Roach concludes that 9/11 did not fundamentally change anything,
"[r]ather, it accelerated a number of preexisting challenges already faced
by Canada.",6 Law was already seen as the symbolic gesture of choice
whenever there was a well-publicized issue-be it the murders at L'Ecole
Polytechnique in Montreal or violence against women and spousal assault
issues. Roach lists the laws that were already in place to charge and convict
the serious offenses committed by terrorists. As Roach states, the existing
criminal laws already carried the maximum penalties, including life
imprisonment.7 As noted, the law already had the stature of a powerful
symbolizing force that indicated, as perhaps few other societal mechanisms
do, the outrage or at least the intolerance of society to certain acts.
An important point that Roach makes, however, is that only certain
acts-or perhaps, more accurately, only certain victims-warrant these
3 See Kent Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (Montreal and Kingston:
McGillQueen's University Press, 2001) at 224, n. 77.
4"Either you're with us or with the terrorists" Globe & Mail (21 September,
2001) Al.
5 Supra note 3.
6 Ibid. at 15.

7 Ibid. at 23.
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shows of outrage. All victims and likewise all suspects or all criminals are
not equal in this legal arena. Roach raises an important argument in his
"contextual and narrative" analysis of the legislation.8 He notes that only
some narratives are heard, and those narratives are interpreted through the
politics of the legal drafting process. Part of this process involves three sorts
of narratives: The immodest claims of government to justify the new
powers; the narratives pertaining to the victims of the attacks; and the
narratives of those "experts" speaking in support of or against the
legislative changes. The University of Toronto symposium that resulted in
the book, The Security of Freedom:Essays on Canada'sAnti-terrorismBill,9
was an important gathering. Who was in attendance? Certainly, attendees
were mainly lawyers with a smattering of political scientists. Even the
Justice officials and the civil liberties representatives were uniformly
lawyers-all sharing in part a common law-oriented narrative. However,
even in this gathering, the concerns were political and social, rather than a
black-letter law approach to understanding the complex issues.
In preparing this review, it was instructive to analyze the reviews by
other scholars, each seeing the post-9/11 "problems" differently, and hence
each seeing the strengths and weaknesses of Roach's analysis through the
prism of their own interpretation. Underlying much of the controversy is
the unverified, and I would argue unverifiable, question as to whether the
attacks in New York and Washington signaled an era of profoundly
different terrorism-more irrational, more frequent, and more massively
destructive. This is the preferred message of some politicians, some media,
some academics, and of course the entire U.S. Homeland Security group.
Roach is guilty of challenging this message. A review of Roach's book by
University of Toronto academic Wesley Wark refers to "the new security
environment" and criticizes Roach for failing to appreciate these new
realities.10
There may be nothing new about the cause, the scale, or the
individual fear that has been generated by the 9/11 attacks. What is
profoundly different is the specific target, and the media attention that it
generated. And yes, citizens in North America, and perhaps western
nations, do fear that they are vulnerable in a way that had previously been
reserved for other citizens in whose lives terrorist acts are possibly even
common. Perhaps, rather than an era of new terrorist threats, the lesson to
8 Ibid. at 74.
9 Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on
Canada'sAnti-terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
10Wesley K. Wark, "Has anti-terrorism bill made Canada safer?" The Globe and Mail (12 July
2003) D12 (WL).
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be derived from the attacks ought to have been an awareness of the preexisting insecurities, encouraging an appreciation of the atrocities occurring
world-wide and the social, economic, and political responses that fuel
ongoing acts of violence.
The environment in which the anti-terrorism legislation was
debated is essential to understanding the speed with which it was enacted,
the content of the new powers, and more general responses. It is possible
to trace the blaming exercise for the World Trade Center and Washington
attacks from original statements made by the U.S. government about Good
vs. Evil and God vs. the Devil, to looking off-shore to firm up an alliance of
international support, and to identifying the "Axis of Evil"-with the
assertion that everyone who did not join was, therefore, on the opposing
team. It was not long, however, before the finger was pointed closer to
home, focussing on the "open and dangerous" Canada-U.S. border. Only
after a full year was there any open acknowledgement that some of the
failings might be even closer to home and internal to U.S. institutional
failures-with perhaps even some consideration of U.S. policy. Each of
these stages of blame-making was accomplished by the rhetoric that
identified the weak links external to the United States that were seen to be
causing specific harm to the country, followed by pressures and demands
for policy and legislative changes. U.S. homeland security was to be secured
far and wide from the confines of the United States.
The loudest voices during the early period following the attacks
tended to support the more extreme interpretation. Under this
interpretation, countries agreed to significant changes with little opposition,
in order to fight the scourge of terrorism, with little consideration given to
whether or not the changes would relate in any real way to greater security.
Hence, these countries called for an all-out war against terrorists that was,
in many cases, translated into draconian laws, broadened policing powers,
military enhancements, and closer alignment with the United States. Even
some critics of the proposed Canadian legislation saw the situation in an
extreme light. Roach quite rightly appears ambivalent as to the position
that he grants to former Liberal backbencher, human rights lawyer, Irwin
Cotler (currently the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada),
who was one of the speakers at the Security of Freedom University of
Toronto Workshop.' Cotler expresses at times a concern with the breadth
of the legislation but then engages in rhetoric such as the "new

Daniels, Macklein & Roach, supra
note 9.
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transnational superterrorist. 1
Following Stanley Cohen's classic moral panic sequence, 3 since
9/11 we continue to be treated to warnings of some impending or potential
terrorist acts-warnings that create fear but offer no ability for the ordinary
citizen to respond rationally. Any moral panic will involve responses from
a bevy of "experts". In many cases, the hype of the panic overshadows the
lack of credentials of those who offer the most vociferous opinions. The
threat is seen to be foreign but inside our communities and is, hence,
perceived to be both a betrayal and deadly. In speaking about late
eighteenth century London and Paris, Allan Silver describes the sense of
fear generated by what was perceived to be the "criminal, vicious and
violent" rapidly multiplying poor in cities whose number had no precedent
in western history:
It was much more than a question of annoyance, indignation, or personal insecurity; the
social order itself was threatened by an entity whose characteristic name reflects the fears of
14
the time-the "dangerous classes."

These new forms of civil unrest were seen to represent a challenge
to the fabric of society and to demand that a garrison force (police or
military) act to suppress this "internal enemy." While the terrorism of 9/11
is of a very different ilk than the riots in eighteenth century England, the
sense that the fundamental fabric of the society was at risk may be similar.
Perceived risks within Canada were compounded by pressures from the
United States for policy and legislative change that were deemed to be
essential to protect their territory. Roach quotes from Stanley Cohen's
namesake, Stanley A. Cohen, a senior Department of Justice Canada
official, who stated well before 9/11: "Distressing events, especially well
publicized events, galvanize politicians and policy makers to legislative
action.... [U]ltimately there are limits to the ability of the formal law to
deter or prevent crime."15
A vying for toughness of response pits the Federal government
12 Irwin Cotler, "Does the anti-terrorism bill go too far? No: We need powerful new legal tools
to fight the new global terror threat" The Globe and Mail (20 November 2001) (WL). See also Roach,
supra note 3 at 81.
13 Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, 2nd ed. (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1980).
14 "The Demand for Order in Civil Society" in David J.Bordua, ed., The Police: Six Sociological
Essays (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967) 1 at 3.
15"Law Reform, the Charter, and the Future of Criminal Law" in Jamie Cameron, ed., The
Charter'sImpact on the CriminalJustice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 344 at 347, cited in Roach,
supra note 3 at 23-24.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 43, NO. I & 2

against the expectations, desires, or demands of the government of the
United States. In addition to a presumed need for changes, opportunism
abounded! From down in the pit at ground zero, out to the far reaches of
the globe, agencies and individuals looked to capitalize on terrorism. In
government, officials speak of "windows of opportunity"-in other words,
moments in time that allow for new policies or laws to be passed that the
public or the opposition would not normally agree to. The planes through
the towers left in their wake windows of opportunity for many agencies, and
in some cases, for individuals to benefit from new powers, resources, or
mandates, and in the case of a few academics, new reputations to be made.
Roach argues that the justification for the additional powers are as
dangerous as the powers themselves. The federal government argued that
it was via the Charter-proofand pro human-rights anti-terrorism legislation
that security would be enhanced. Roach sees not only the dangers in these
justifications, but also the dangers in what he terms "this narrative
approach" to law making-an approach that had a history prior to 9/11.
Responses favouring the increasingly powerful victims' groups, and quickfixes via the enactment of criminal laws, run through law-making during at
least the past two decades. Roach argues that law ought not to be a
"popularity contest between the accused and the victim, because the victim
will win every time. 1 6 This is true, not just because of the sympathy due to
victims, but also because victims' groups are extremely powerful in Ottawa.
One thinks of groups such as Caveat-articulate, well funded, and
extremely well organized. Victims' groups have had a significant impact on
the enactment of laws and on the sentencing process. Hence, the vivid
images from 9/11, and narratives such as the daily New York Times
biographies on each of the victims, ought not to justify abrupt termination
of all due rights and protections.
Roach is not naive to the limitations of the criminal law to actually
deliver security, equality, or sense of justice that is demanded, and then
promised, by the state via the passing of new laws. While one reviewer
criticizes Roach for offering "a vision of law as the ultimate foundation of
societal values," 17 a careful reading of Roach's book reveals quite a
different picture. Repeatedly, Roach argues that law will be turned to as
the symbolic response, but that there is little evidence that tougher laws will
actually deter terrorists. Roach argues that there were sufficient laws in
place before 9/11 to deal with all of the crimes that occurred during that
attack and any further attacks. Supplying adequate legal powers is not,
16 Roach, supra note 3 at 82.
17 Wark, Supra note 10.
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however, the sole function of the legislative process-instilling a sense of
"control" and "security" becomes an equal or even prime objective. He
argues that the lessons learned from the treatment of ordinary criminals
ought to make one question the notion of deterrence. And yet, tougher,
stronger penalties are trotted out as the appropriate response to gaining
greater security from terrorism. Quick legislative responses have the
political salience that is missing from the more profound search for ways to
eliminate root causes. As Roach states: "Canadians have relied on the
criminal law in a desperate and frequently vain quest for an increased sense
desire to express concern for those
of security and an understandable
18
crime.,
by
victimized
Roach deals less thoroughly with the provisions of the new powers
that are intended to prevent terrorism-via the identification of dangerous
people before they are allowed to act-rather than the powers to arrest
after the event. He expresses a concern for the breadth of powers, such as
preventative detention and the investigative hearings. He notes, for
example, that the peace bonds for terrorists builds on what was to have
been very restrictive use of peace bonds in cases involving organized
crimes.t 9 While it is likely that more controversial cases will arise, Roach
documents the potential for abuse, as cases such as Michel Jalbert, Maher
Arar, Ahmad Abou El-Maati, and Abdullah Almalki continue to gain
public profile, and in the case of Arar, a formal inquiry. Likewise, Richard
Mosley, a senior Federal Justice official (and now a judge) stated at the
Security of Freedom symposium:
[W]e are very concerned with the impact of this legislation on the ethno-cultural
we reached out to national organizations representing those
communities of Canada ...
communities. That was particularly with reference to the Arab, the Islamic, and the Afghan
communities within Canada. ... There is always the capacity for abuse....20

The anti-terrorism legislation does make various changes to the role
that the justice sectors are now to play, and continues the shift away from
the crime per se, toward what traditionally used to be merely seen as
evidentiary material. However, even this change could be seen to have a
precedent in organized crime legislation (Bill C-95 and Bill C-24), which
come extremely close to criminalizing membership in groups defined as
organized crime groups. This organized crime legislation is also instructive
in emphasizing an additional point that Roach makes: Powers brought in
18 Roach, supra note 3 at 15.
19 Ibid. at 49
20 Daniels, Macklem & Roach, supra note 9 at 445.
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to target selective threats can quickly be normalized to apply much more
broadly. The original proceeds of crime legislation, passed in 1989, applied
to some twenty-four "enterprise crime" offenses, plus designated drug
offenses. These offenses grew in number to approximately forty-and now
the proceeds of crime seizure powers apply to most indictable offences and
include, under certain circumstances, powers of preventive detention.
Likewise, the international preoccupation with money laundering has
resulted in a significant shift away from both the predicate crime and the
criminal, to what some critics see as a misplaced-and perhaps also a
"state-grab"-focus on the criminal proceeds. This focus on criminal
proceeds has been enhanced by the new focus on terrorist financing-all
without an iota of evidence that targeting money laundering has any impact
on organized crime-even when the offenses are profit driven. How much
less likely will it be that we achieve more security from the current
legislated requirement that front-line bank tellers, business folk, in addition
to law enforcement agencies, must now focus on the financing of
ideologically driven terrorist operations? Identifying legitimate proceeds
that may be put to a future criminal use is impossible.
Roach argues that it is unfortunate that Canadian lawmakers did
not have enough confidence to rely on the traditional principles that saw
motive as a method of eliminating suspects, and not as a crime in itself.
Hence, "we criminalized political and religious motives by making them an
essential part of the many new crimes of terrorism."'" Later, he writes: "we
do not need a special motive-based criminal law to denounce and punish
the crimes of terrorism."22 Once you move into this realm, racial or
religious profiling and the elimination of the presumptions of innocence
may be the result. Again, those "experts" who maintain that 9/11
fundamentally changed everything may see these "costs" as necessary ones.
This view will, however, be coloured by who you are. Various Muslim
groups, and other visible minorities who "look" dangerous to ill-informed
members of the public, customs officials, or law enforcement agencies, are
right to hold a different view. Roach catalogues some of the profiling
impacts following both the attack and the Canadian response. I am not as
optimistic as Roach in believing that adding a non-discrimination clause to
Bill C-36 (as apparently they did in the U.S. to the PatriotAct) would have
any impact-except again, perhaps symbolically.
It is impossible to do justice to all of the points raised by Roach. In
terms of how Canadian anti-terrorism policies should evolve in the future,
21 Roach, supra note 3 at 28.
22 Ibid. at 82.
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Roach argues for less reliance on a criminal or military approach. Shortterm repressive solutions imposed by possibly violent and corrupt enforcers
will add to the level of insecurity. Even truly professional and ethical police
ought not to be seen to have a monopoly on the resolutions to conflicts. As
the former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy stated, we
need to move beyond legal approaches and view problems, instead, from
a broad human security perspective. 23 This view will, of course, outrage
those who see 9/11 as a watershed event. A critical review of Roach by
Philippe Lagass6 takes Roach to task for failing to provide proof that a
24
human security approach would weaken terrorism. Lagass6 agrees with
the criticisms that Wesley Wark aimed at Roach, that Roach displays "no
sense of the new security environment or the realities against which Bill C36 was designed to operate." 5 Lagass6 goes on to say that Roach "ignores
the moral imperative of the war on terrorism. ''26 Perhaps better than any
other, this phrase, "the moral imperative of war," illustrates the sense of
"rightness" that both sides bring to their arguments-with belief rather
than cold facts as support.
As Roach notes, it is heartening that eleven countries including
Canada and the UK (but not the United States) agreed to the following
statement at the Progressive Summit: "We must be resolute in fighting
terrorism and equally resolute in tackling its causes ... .For the only lasting
answers lie in justice, more effective international cooperation, peace and
freedom, democracy and development.'2 7
As Roach acknowledges, these are platitudes-but platitudes that
counter the war-mongering platitudes that dwell on the capturing, and
possibly torture, of evildoers. Roach builds a solid argument to support his
claim that what has changed has been an acceleration of responses. In
terms of assessing the appropriateness of these responses, perhaps two
years has been too short of a period. What we do not know can hurt us.
Countering terrorism requires secret security intelligence operations, and
yes, former Justice Minister Anne McLellan, as holder of secret
information, has a responsibility to pass laws for our protection. However,
23 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release, "Axworthy Launches
Hemispheric Dialogue on Drugs During Visit to Jamaica" (8 January 1999).
24 Book Review of September 11: Consequencesfor Canada by Kent Roach (2003) 4 Can. Mil. J.
70, online: National Defence <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no3/book5_e.asp> [cited
to Can. Mil. J.].
25 Supra note 10 at D12.
26

Supra note 24 at 71.
27 Shawn McCarthy, "Anti-terror coalition's fissures are showing" The Globe and Mail (25
February 2002) (WL), cited in Roach, supra note 3 at 196.
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already we are seeing abuses that flow from new powers with old or nonexistent accountability mechanisms. "You can trust us" has never been a
safe formula. The debate, the negotiations, and the outcome of the
Canadian responses to the attacks of 9/11 were significantly different from
those in the United States. Whether there is fodder for a worthy debate
regarding the gain or loss of our sovereignty in the process is open for
further discussion. However, the more important question is the one Roach
most fully addresses: The appropriateness of the Canadian response for
Canada.

COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS,
UNILA TERALISM, AND THE GLOBAL ORDER. BY IKECHI MGBEOJI
(VANCOUVER: UBC PRESS, 2003) 186 pages'
By Richard Falk 2
Not long ago I read for the first time Toni Morrison's extraordinary
novel Beloved.3 Aside from its literary merit, including the beauty of the
language, the book depicts the harsh cruelties of slavery and its aftermath
with such vividness and integrity that I found the reading experience both
deeply moving and an indictment of my own past ignorance. Not an
ignorance of slavery, of course, but of its depraved detailed practices that
make one aware of the horrifying impacts on the daily lives of AfricanAmericans. On reflection, this usefully disturbing book led me to a better
understanding of how, as a society, we sanitize the ugly realities of the past
so as to dull their sharp edges in the present. One result is that American
society and its citizenry have never truly come to terms with the deep and
persisting moral challenges that slavery continues to pose for present
generations. While reading Beloved, I concluded that every young person
in America, and probably elsewhere, should be required to read and
respond to this work of "fiction," so as to grasp more truly the savage
"reality" of slavery and racism, and why it continues to leave fresh wounds
and defacing scars generations hence.
I had somewhat similar feelings while reading Ikechi Mgbeoji's fine

[Collective Insecurity]
2 Visiting Professor, Global Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2002-2005 and
Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University.
3(New York: New American Library,
1988).

